Adaptabilty vs. Rigidity
Not sure if I'll follow this blog regularly or not, but it might provide some good food for thought at least now and then. The issue for today - whether 'adaptable reasoned ethics' are better than 'rigid doctrinal morals'.
I'll grant him that some Christians make the incredibly lopsided arguments that he leads off with. Not all, but some. He seems to realize this, and I appreciate that much.
However, he doesn't really address this issue adequately by any means. After scanning his blog a bit for info about him, I have hunches about why this might be, and I suspect that his example of euthanasia is probably much more personal in basis than one might get from a casual reading of this single blog entry.
First off, he gets the premise wrong - and granted, many Christians do as well. The premise ought not to be that just those without a faith in the triune God of the Bible are "debased and naturally prone to...'immoral' behavior." The Biblical premise is that everyone is debased and naturally prone to immoral behavior. Christians are no better in this regard, except that we acknowledge our condition for what it is, and seek out the only treatment for it - the salvation won for us through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Son of God incarnate. Those outside the Christian faith either have a different way of dealing with their condition, or don't recognize their true condition.
Next he makes some analogies between humans and the animal kingdom, which of course is problematic for to Christians, since our anthropology states that we are fundamentally different than animals, bearing within us the image of God. Pack behavior in animals may be all well and good, but using that to justify or explain our own behavior as humans is problematic at best. I would think that this tactic would be problematic for those who hold to natural selection as well, given how shocked they are when animals demonstrate any of the tendencies or abilities that they selfishly and egotistically associate only with human beings.
The second major error he makes is in assuming that it is out of fear of God that Christians seek to obey Him. Biblically, it's clear that there is nothing we can do on our own to make God happy. No amount of following the rules is ever going to get us points in God's book, because we are still imperfect. Imperfection is never good enough for perfection. I don't obey God out of fear, so that I hopefully will earn the right to heaven. This is an effort to manipulate God into doing what I want Him to do, whether that's padding my bank account or opening up the Pearly Gates. Rather, I obey God out of gratitude for what God has already done. There's nothing that can happen in my life, to me or to someone else, that can ever show me that God does not love me or the other person(s) involved. I know better. And because God is so rich in His love, I want to share that love with others the best I can, so that they'll experience it and come to know and trust it as well. Oddly enough, when I attempt to share God's love, I find that I'm obeying the law. Not perfectly, but that my actions are in keeping with what the law requires. Love and the law are identical in their appearances to others - their primary difference is the effect they have on me.
The author promotes situational ethics as the only means for ensuring that we make more "humane, empathetic decisions." However, it is just such situational ethics that are likely to result in exactly the opposite effect. What he refers to as "rigid, doctrinal morals" help us to maintain clarity when blinded by emotions or other subjective factors. And he makes the fundamental assumption that our decisions are what matters, since there is no God who would have anything to say on the matter.
On the issue of euthanasia, the author's emphasis is on how to be humane and empathetic. He does not define these terms, but I infer that he is concerned primarily with suffering. But for a Biblical Christian, the emphasis is on being faithful. On bearing witness to the fact that, just as we didn't determine when we were born, we aren't the best qualified to determine when we die. On bearing witness to the fact that comfort or mobility or productivity or pleasure are not the overriding determinants of our existence, and the absence of any or all of these things does not automatically mean that our life has no purpose or is no longer worth living.
His closing arguments are very utilitarian in nature - minimize suffering, thereby maximizing pleasure (but for whom?). He alludes to a greater good, but does not define it. If minimizing suffering is the basis by which we ought to make decisions, then a host of other alternatives - some currently promoted here or elsewhere in the world, others not yet accepted but for no sound logical reason, if our sole determination of their appropriateness is the minimization of suffering. Subjective ethics makes the very premise of a guiding principle for ethical decision making anachronistic, as it immediately sets up a new 'rigid doctrine' to replace the 'rigid doctrine' that it eliminated. Christians are too dogmatic regarding euthanasia. So we eliminate that 'rigid doctrine' and replace it with the new rigid doctrine of situational ethics. The arbitrary subdefinitions of humaneness and empathy are transient. They can - and likely will - be replaced by other motivations over time.
The problem with situational ethics is they are convenient for handling the individual situation at hand that the author refers to, but they inevitably lead to situations that the promoters of situational ethics would likely *not* find to be convenient or useful or even healthy. Unfortunately, they'll have no grounds to stand on to argue against new applications of a new situational ethics down the road, since they'll be written off as just being stodgy, rigid doctrinalists with outdated viewpoints.
Funny how life works, ain't it?
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